SORM, what it does and general situation with surveillance/censorship in Russia is no longer secret for anons and these documents might be true, haven't checked them yet.
However, there are more than one company developing DPI and monitoring solutions in Russia, some of them publish corporate blogs, and even one of such devices got into hands of habrahabr user, revealing poor quality of your average subcontractor who usually hires a CS student for food and launders 1,5 million dollars for his work:
City transport companies buy data off mobile operators to plan their routes, Yandex owns all big city taxis and is the sole provider for official bus/metro/commute train navigation apps. The fun thing, you can find all this info on habrahabr, both in corporate blogs and ordinary IT guy's blogs busting these apps shitty security and excessive datamining.
Another example, cities like Moscow have a centralized network of surveillance cameras, on roads, in apartment buildings and streets, in metro, every train and bus. It is also known that they use automatic face and walking posture recognition already for APBs. There is a website anyone can visit, register with their state ID and start snooping on people in real time.
Biggest russian "anonymous" imageboard 2ch handed itself to Mail.ru corporation in late 2016. It's pretty damn /cyber/ life here in Russia, more soykaf than schway though.
Not all network operators implement SORM properly, and sometimes it doesn't work. But most of them are bought out by state corporation Rostelecom. Mobile network operators are the worst since they clearly break the "net neutrality" principle and don't try to hide it. Limited data plans since lat year, "social networking" data plans and so on, traffic throttling aka QoS, DPI and http request filtering are in common knowledge and people are trying to bypass them. For example, simple shadowsocks is throttled by Yota operator, but when you add obfuscation and spoof headers as "vk.com", the speed goes back to advertised.
Source, this thread: