/kc/ - Krautchan

diaspora of krautchan unite

Posting mode: Reply

Check to confirm you're not a robot
Drawing x size canvas

Remember to follow the rules

Max file size: 100.00 MB

Max files: 4

Max message length: 4096

Manage Board | Moderate Thread

Return | Catalog | Bottom

Expand All Images

Battles Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 10:27:19 [Preview] No. 8950
I've already mentioned the book titled On Killing - The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society by Dave Grossman (Lt. Col. of US Army). It gave some food for thought and I'm planning to write some of my speculation.

But what did the author write? Let's summarize.
He starts with the observation that most men has a natural resistance to kill (only 2% of men - those who have "predisposition toward aggressive psychopathic personality" - can go on killing without becoming a nervous wreck). This resistance is so high that even at times that our life is directly threatened (like others shoot at us) still difficult to overcome it. This resistance is the reason why infantry fire was so embarrassingly ineffective in the past 300 years - with the exception of machine guns - despite the fact that infantry weaponry (rifles) are reliable and accurate enough to cause massive losses among the enemy.
The author gives examples and sources, such as a Prussian experiment in the late 18th century, several reports and notices from several authors during 19-20th centuries (American, French, Israeli etc.), and an interesting work by a US Army historian who (and his coworkers) made mass interviews with fighting GIs during and after WWII. Also he cites his own conversation with veterans of WWII and Vietnam.
He gives new ideas on what's really happening on the battlefield. He compliments the widely known fight-or-flight model with two other options: in reality the soldiers can fight, posture, submit or flight. And most soldiers choose the second option.
Then he ponders on what enables killing (I'm gonna write more about this later) and how modern (post-WWII) armies achieve this. Then he compares these methods with the ways of contemporary mass media. His conlcusion is (after pointing out the exponential rise of violent crimes) that mass media has an undesirable effect on society.

What interesting for me is this resistance, and the enabling part. These things are actually give an entirely new way of looking warfare, and how and why battles were won.
For example the part officers (the demanding authority to kill) play in the enabling. When people (professional historians, history pros and other armchair generals) comparing the Hellenic phalanx with Roman manipulus and why the latter was more successful they compare everything but the officers. In the phalanx he's only one among those who stand in line and do the poking with pikes, but a Roman officer is one outside the formation and pressuring the soldiers to kill. It makes a huge difference if someone shouting in your ears "stab! stab! stab!" and generally pressuring you to kill. Especially if this one person is an exemplary one, a veteran whose skill in killing surpasses all the others in that particular unit. However noone talks about this because noone thinks about it.

I'll continue this sometimes, maybe only next weekend, we'll see. If you wish to read the book you can probably find it on libgen.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 12:46:11 [Preview] No. 8952 del
>He starts with the observation that most men has a natural resistance to kill (only 2% of men

I think that premise is wrong. People easily kill each other in so called affect state, i.e. when they are enraged or afraid of death. I guess he says about 2% only when there is calm person who need to kill someone unrelated to him at all.

>This resistance is the reason why infantry fire was so embarrassingly ineffective in the past 300 years - with the exception of machine guns - despite the fact that infantry weaponry (rifles) are reliable and accurate enough to cause massive losses among the enemy.

There are plenty of reasons why armed warfare wasn't too costly in past times, and most of them are technological. But this is very broad theme to discuss. Avoiding of unnecessary violence sure has relation to it, but putting it forward seems wrong. Although broader concept like "discipline" can include it too.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 13:41:02 [Preview] No. 8954 del
(74.59 KB 724x1024 1500074692137m.jpg)
I read the book when it came out OP. US Marine. Some people, with European heritage, love fighting. Most of the rest of the world does not. People are different. It is useless to compile statistics on education without considering the ethnic make-up of the study, and so the same principle applies here.

Getting faggots to fight is like getting a negro to read. Its a real chore.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 13:48:57 [Preview] No. 8955 del
>easily kill each other
That's a very huge overstatement. Even in affect state. Among normal people. It doesn't goes easily even to that 2%.
Let's see:
- Hungary is a country of 10 million people.
- From the 10 million 1,4 million was under 15 in 2014.
- In 2015 we had 280 113 (registered) crimes, 205 was homicide.
- The 8,6 million (more or less) adult committed 205 homicide.
- If every murder was committed by a different person that means 205 murderer, that's about 0,000023% of the adult population, and 0,0011% of that 172 000 person who has some predisposition towards "aggressive psychopathic personality".
- From that 280 113 crimes many (about 13-14 000 in 2015) are assaults (not exactly assault but it's the closest juristical term) which tells me that even when enraged people rather choose to beat up others over killing them.

However with this and the other stuff you wrote you highlighted an important thing. I cannot expect Bernd to accept the premise just like that and while it wasn't my intention I'll write or more like copypaste some proofs.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 13:52:27 [Preview] No. 8956 del
My original thought which flowered from the soil of the book is about the warfare of the medieval Europe or rather the changes of it. So for my purpose the contents of the book is very fit.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 14:02:00 [Preview] No. 8957 del
Also I think (I hope) most of us don't have first hand experience on killing so our perception how it get done is influenced by the depictions of popular culture (movies, books, comics, other products of art).

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 14:43:50 [Preview] No. 8958 del
Intradesting. I think we discussed it on old /kc/ tho.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 14:58:17 [Preview] No. 8959 del
There is one thing: it isn't easy to kill someone, especially if you have no weapons. And even with knife it isn't easy as may look. People are sturdy creatures, and you can easily stop being in affect while being in fight, and everyone will live. Beating, for example. easily gets your anger off in few minutes.

Being good in classic hand-to-hand combat also requires training, that is why in Medieval times warrior class wasn't numerous, and there often was shortage of proper soldiers while general population was large. When guns appeared, everything changed. I think it is mostly technical thing.

>Also I think (I hope) most of us don't have first hand experience on killing

I almost killed one person in self-defense situation when I was kid. Maybe he even died later, I don't know results. I clearly remember that I didn't care about severity of my actions when I did this and didn't had any moral block. I was very affected and didn't control myself (although I had no choice).

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 15:53:52 [Preview] No. 8960 del
>He starts with the observation that most men has a natural resistance to kill (only 2% of men - those who have "predisposition toward aggressive psychopathic personality" - can go on killing without becoming a nervous wreck). This resistance is so high that even at times that our life is directly threatened (like others shoot at us) still difficult to overcome it.
Pretty sure this only exists in-group. But I wouldn't be surprised to learn that the westerner, who also exhibits pathological altruism regardless of group-affiliation as well, i somehow psychologically impaired compared to other races, not having a mechanism to tell a difference between "us" and "them".

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 17:06:10 [Preview] No. 8961 del
Yes, we discussed it briefly, however back then I just recommended after reading a few paragraph as it had some unusual hence interesting points. We didn't have much talk on it. Now I've an ulterior motive as ultimately I'd like to present some of my ideas and I need to explain some stuff explained in that book.
Also I hoped it would give us some topic to seriously discuss.

There are some factors which enables us to kill (as I mentioned in OP) and I'll present them in time. But basically most of these are just the same: somehow denying the humanity of the victim. For example police officers can rely on moral distance to rationalize a killing of theirs: they are on the side of the law, the criminal is an outlaw and this makes the criminal less then a human bean for them, so it's not that big of a problem if they die. Self defense also gives us justification and makes it easier to cross the line - the attacker violates the societies moral so this makes him less then human.

It's very good you mentioned knife and training. Both are topics in the book.
Have you, Bernds, know that Roman legionaries were trained and conditioned to use the point of their gladius? The officers shunned slashing with the sword as it gave shittier results then stabbing. If you slash a person on his torso while it makes a nasty cut the ribcage shields the important organs while the stabbing can reach those. In a battle a stab in the torso will most probably lethal. However soldiers of all epochs tend not to stab so legionaries had to be forced to stab with training and with the encouragement of their superiors in battle.
You probably notices however that bayonets tend not to have a sharp edge also the first bayonets were nothing more than a round metal rod with a pointy end. The reason is the soldiers resistance to stabbing and prefering the edge of a weapon in fight and this forced to soldiers to use their bayonets as their superiors wanted them to. In theory at least because it was extremely rare that a bayonet charge resulted in stabbing contest. Most of the time one side or the other fled but when the charge ended with a fight the soldiers turned their rifle and used the butt of it as a club despite the fact that stabbing would be more productive.
This is all because men will choose the less lethal option.

Nevertheless I'm glad that you don't live a life as a child child-killer.

>Pretty sure this only exists in-group.
Nope. Of course it's easier to deny the humanity of an outsider. Tribe names comes to my mind when the meaning of the name of my tribe is human but the other tribe is something else (like food).
I think good to have the sense of "us" and "them". But it's even better if one can look over it and judge things on different basis but still can apply it on demand.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 18:10:17 [Preview] No. 8962 del
>Nope. Of course it's easier to deny the humanity of an outsider.
That's a very Eurocentric view of the matter, through the eyes and instincts of an European. Non-Europeans automatically don't view foreigners as humans.

Bernd 07/16/2017 (Sun) 21:34:54 [Preview] No. 8963 del
>Non-Europeans automatically don't view foreigners as humans.

same as e*ropeans

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 04:38:39 [Preview] No. 8964 del
(694.87 KB 747x898 1497393257462.png)
Napolean said to his Dragoons as they passed in review, "The tip, the tip!" This was to remind them to stab. During the Napoleonic Wars it was found that a slahed man would return to the front after 3 months, with a low percentage of fatalities, but a stabbed man had a very high chance of being killed and if only wounded, would be wounded much longer. General Patton designed a straight cavalry sword, the last sword adopted by the US Army, that was exclusively for thrusting. The best dagger was the long and slender stabbing short-swords of rennisance Italy, because you coyld get the vital organs and not get stopped by the ribcage. Stabbing is superior. This was even learned by the Japanese although they had a curved Katana. The curve, like the Cossack sabers, was to enable a cut on horseback. On foot the use of spears in hand-to-hand combat was more common than swords, and of course they used bows and arrows a lot. Swords were expensive and knives had a short range. I kbow I've ranted here but the point is that stabbing has been the preferred way to fight by most countries over history. Hell, those Wolly Mammoths weren't clubbed of slashed to death, because primitive people used spears to stab them with great effect. Stabbing is the preferred way to use a blade.

Now for the motivation part, that is probably easier than I said earlier, if you have the right genes for it. If you read the book then you have Operant and Pavlonian conditioning. Just practice, practice, practice, and you will have no problem doing what needs to be done. You will then just not think about it and rely on your training. In WW2 they had lousy rates of participation because they didn't have enough time to practice. Often they got one week of rifle training before being sent to the front, and shot less than 400 rounds of ammo in training.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 05:11:43 [Preview] No. 8965 del
That's an interesting claim and it needs some form a validation. I might guess what you think about tho. I've a longer reply addressing some points but it's morning, and probably I'll arrive to those anyway by going through the proofs Grossman presents in his book.
However I can say: maybe so, but pretty much this >>8963 as we don't talk about the typical sample of a modern westerners you mentioned here >>8960 and taking dehumanizing into practice and start to kill is a different matter then simply think others as not a human.
Also there will be other examples of denying humanity and it's largely different what you would think it really means.

>I kbow I've ranted here
It's /kc/ this is the place for long winded ramblings on topics only a handful of people would be interested.

I wondered about the katana if it was made on purpose a slashing weapon so when they defeat unarmored peasants (the intended use) the workforce would remain more intact with crazy but more easily healing wounds which impairs less but scares the peasants more (basically a tool of posturing to submit the enemy for longer periods).

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 17:28:47 [Preview] No. 8970 del
Kevin B. MacDonald talks a lot about it, the uniqueness of European culture of indiscriminate help and compassion towards any human.
He also explains pretty well why we jews are superior, greenly with envy.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 17:37:41 [Preview] No. 8971 del
Katana is designed as a slashing weapon because of poor quality of Japanese iron ore and process of manufacturing, where steel of different hardness is layered to give a hard but brittle edge on a softer bulkier back. When a sword cools down, the back contracts more than the blade, giving the sword curvature. This wasn't necessary in, say, Chinese swords, due to higher ore quality, and they are generally straight.

There are, however, other weapons that are much more obviously made for slashing and crowd control of unarmoured opponents (i.e. peasants); the southern Indian urumi, made of very soft steel and extremely long, basically a cross between a whip and a sword.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=uZ0Nc2kHba4 [Embed]
https://youtube.com/watch?v=eMAsCuDFSUI [Embed]

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 17:50:46 [Preview] No. 8972 del
(93.22 KB 736x466 butt.jpg)
Now I'm gonna post about that Prussian experiment I mentioned then ramble a bit. Let's start with a quote from the book:
"John Keegan and Richard Holmes in their book Soldiers tell us of a Prussian experiment in the late 1700s in which an infantry battalion fired smoothbore muskets at a target one hundred feet long by six feet high, representing an enemy unit, which resulted in 25 percent hits at 225 yards, 40 percent hits at 150 yards, and 60 percent hits at 75 yards. This represented the potential killing power of such a unit."
This experiment shows how accurate were these rifles (well muskets, they weren't rifled) in the trained hand of the Prussian line infantry. A musketman of the era could fire 4-5 shots per minute, but let's say just 4. This would mean a unit consisting of 200 men was capable of inflicting 480 casualties per minute from about 70-75 metres. This also means they could have obliterated a same sized unit under 30 seconds. Battles should have concluded in an minutes.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 17:51:46 [Preview] No. 8973 del
(242.78 KB 900x604 einsiedel-6-l.jpg)
Let's review a battle of the Napoleonic Wars and do a bit of counting. I tried to search for one optimal but on such short notice I had to compromise a bit. Still sounds all right for the purpose.
Battle of Eylau in 1807
This is a battle between the French and Russians (with a smaller Prussian contingent).
Why is it ideal for us? It's a middle sized battle, both sides are largely the same and the losses are quite high. It took the most part of two days, let's say 20 hours in all with longer periods when line infantry engaged each other.
Why isn't ideal? The weather can be blamed to counter my argument, as a snowstorm made fighting and targeting harder then usual. But the high number of casualties still speak of efficiency, also there wouldn't be any battle if their marshalls didn't think the weather adequate for fighting.
The two sides fielded 75-75 000 men. Now let's take a closer look on the French side.
They employed 32 line infantry regiments, about 1000 men each (or more), that's about 32 000 riflemen fighting like the Prussian experiment supposed. There were other types of infantry of course but their role could differ (like picketing, skirmishing, leading assaults against fortified posotions etc.) so they don't count now.
The French caused 20 000 casualities (dead and wounded) in all if we are generous 15 000 if we aren't. Let's say we are. Very few people surrendered during this particular battle however we don't know about the fate of some but let's make things simpler and assume all dead and wounded. So 20 000 it is.
The losses were caused by the three arms: infantry, cavalry, artillery. The field artillery was the most effective in that era basically they were the precursor of machine gun teams both in usage (for example grapeshot from point blank range can be seen as a parallel of impact of a machine gun) and in efficiency. While I would estimate the cavalry the least efficient in inflicting losses (in battle but during chase or harrassing it's a different story) but this particular battle had seen some of the greatest cavalry charge of the era resulting in some nice figting against infantry and between cavalry units. Probably with high losses.
So how much could these 32 000 brave young soldiers kill or wound? I'm gonna be very generous (and lazy) and say 10 000 (I hope this will keep the counting easy). How much were line infatry from these 10 000 who could die the way the Prussian experiments supposed? How much were other types of infanty, cavalry and artillery gunner? Oh no I won't go there. I won't calculating the uncalculatable, let's just estimate 8000 dead line infantrymen for the kicks.
How long these engagements took between infantry units? Sadly, no idea. There's no timetable of the battle available. Surely they don't stand there loading and firing through the whole 20 hours. Let's say lowly 5 hours. All the other were cavalry fights, arillery bombardment, marching up and down, charging and retreating, picking noses.
Summary: 32 000 soldiers inflicted 8000 casualties in 5 hours.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 17:52:11 [Preview] No. 8974 del
(229.69 KB 905x626 Rava2.jpg)
Let's count!
This means that 32 000 soldiers inflicted 27 casualties in a minute.
This means that a unit of 200 soldiers (like in the Prussian experiment) inflicted 0,16 losses in a minute when they should have kill or wound:
- 1250 times that many from 220 m;
- 2000 times that many from about 150 m;
- 3000 times that many from 70-75 m.
But what if the line infantry's participatoin were much shorter? What if their combined fighting time is only 1 hour.
32 000 soldiers inflicted 135 casualities in a minute.
Which means a unit of 200 soldiers inflicted 0,85 casualities per minute but they should have kill or wound:
- 235 times that many from 220 m;
- 376 times that many from about 150 m;
- 564 times that many from 70-75 m.
The difference is still unexplainably huge.
This is prime example of inefficient fireing.

And the explanation of the otherwise unexplainable difference is: most soldiers just postured (loaded, shouted, pretended to fire, ducked, covered etc.) while didn't actually fight, and most of those who fired on the enemy misfired on purpose.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 19:46:22 [Preview] No. 8982 del
Terrible argument based on not understanding how fighting works. Anyone who has ever done as much as play paintball knows why this doesn't work: because troops in combat will not present themselves fully to the opponent, minimising the options for successful firing. If we go back to paintball (which I have played about half a dozen times with different groups of people), an 8v8 fight should end in about 15 seconds easily, however, from my experience most games took about 5-10 minutes. Amounting to a factor of 20-40. Take into account that paintball fields are generally arranged for dynamic play, and that mistakes don't cost a life.
Fortifications can also easily and quickly be mocked up, as everyone who has watched livestreams of protests in Kiev (holy fuck it's been three and a half years already?) knows.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 19:49:17 [Preview] No. 8983 del
But line infantry fought precisely that way. Right up to times of the American Civil War. They stood straight, shoulder to shoulder in lines and fired at each other from few dozen meters.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 19:50:03 [Preview] No. 8984 del
Similarly, one might compare performance of basketball players in pre-game throw routines to actual in-game performance, arguing that basketball players don't seem to be playing seriously as based on their practice accuracy, game scores should be in 500-500 range.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 19:50:51 [Preview] No. 8985 del
I heard/read about the quality (or rather the lack of it) of the Japanese iron they had to use for their swords. The shitty iron card is usually played against weaboos raving about the sword of the gods, the katana. However it's overplayed now into memetic level. Probably because the people of the internet all right, people in general can only think in extremes. Bipolar world.
Of course most katanas as all the swords all around the word were just a hunk of sharpened steel and not much more. However lots of other products of the weaponsmiths all around a workd were better quality from mediocre to excellent one could find any kind.
The accentuating the brittleness of the hard steel is also overplayed. From the talks one could gather it was porcelain. It's the same when "bushcrafters" and other "experts" babbling about the steel of different knives and why to choose which. It literally hurts.
Also this ore quality sounds dubious. There could be difference between ore and ore but after they're transformed into iron bars how can anyone say that there's a difference between the Fe atoms forming those bars? Two Fe atoms cannot be different else one of them wouldn't be Fe. So a bunch of Fe atoms cannot be different from another bunch of Fe atoms. There could be difference in coal quantity but to making steel one should add more C into the mix anyway.
But why I don't see your post a good argument is this: assuming Japanese couldn't shape their steel into whatever shape they wanted is just wrong. Just imagine a swordsmith and his apprentice conversation in the 8-9th century of Japan:
- Hey let's make a sword!
- All right, master!
- I've a great idea, here's how we're gonna do it.
- But master we already know how to make swords.
- No, my idea is genious! Shut you mouth and bring me the file-grease instead!
- This furnace is fucking hot.
- Shut up, you lazy bastard and work harder!
- Yes, master!
- Oh shit, master! The blade become curved. It doesn't supposed to be that way! Our previous swords were all straight. This new technique fucked us over.
- Oh well. I cannot let my genious idea vanish. We will force everyone to use it by telling the people how straight swords are gay and then we'll make curved swords for a thousand years until they go out of fashion.
No. They perfectly knew what they were doing. They needed curved swords for some reason and this need led to inventing a technique which gave them curved swords.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 19:58:59 [Preview] No. 8986 del
Also the length of their musket and the way how it had to be loaded (through the muzzle and not from behind) forced them to use it standing straight.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 20:00:32 [Preview] No. 8987 del
>There could be difference between ore and ore but after they're transformed into iron bars how can anyone say that there's a difference between the Fe atoms forming those bars? Two Fe atoms cannot be different else one of them wouldn't be Fe. So a bunch of Fe atoms cannot be different from another bunch of Fe atoms. There could be difference in coal quantity but to making steel one should add more C into the mix anyway.
Hardly even close to the actual reality of metallurgy.
There are two important issues: 1) iron ore often contains other metals (chromium, vanadium, etc) which cannot easily be distilled away in the refining process (even in binary mixtures result would be an eutectic mixture, not pure Fe), and secondly, carbon itself forms an alloy with iron, again making the whole system much more complicated.
Also, iron undergoes several phase transitions when cooling down from melt to room temperature. At each phase transition there is an abrupt change in mechanical properties of the metal; it is what leads to tension present in final product. By finetuning composition, one can change temperatures at which those phase transitions occur, or even access hidden phases that aren't possible with pure iron or binary steel.
In any case, I'd assume swords gradually got more curved with time; that there was no phase transition from straight to curved blade. At first, they'd work hard to try to make it straight; later on, slightly curved became the norm and nobody worried about curvature anymore since it isn't too bad.

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 21:44:39 [Preview] No. 8989 del
>There could be difference between ore and ore but after they're transformed into iron bars how can anyone say that there's a difference between the Fe atoms forming those bars?

Oh, this is very serious question. German in >>8987 said mostly true things, although different phases not really related to internal tensions as is, it is mostly about crystallic structure, size of grain etc.

Using term "iron" is incorrect, it is all about steel. Steel is actually an alloy, where iron and carbon are required, and other elements, even in small amounts, can do very serious shift in properties. And processing method, temperatures, speed of cooling/heating, time etc - all this can change property of metal seriously.

This was known in past, but not fully, so smiths often got best results by luck and intuition.

t. metallurgy pro

Bernd 07/17/2017 (Mon) 22:27:21 [Preview] No. 8990 del
>although different phases not really related to internal tensions as is, it is mostly about crystallic structure, size of grain etc.
Indeed – I meant to point out (but didn't explain it properly) that when a phase transition occurs, it doesn't occur through entire block of metal at the same time, so for a while you get tension between pieces that suddenly don't match anymore.

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 00:10:20 [Preview] No. 8994 del
>Terrible argument based on not understanding how fighting works
>But line infantry fought precisely that way.


Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 00:28:56 [Preview] No. 8995 del
Well, it would seem that line infantry fought the wrong way ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 05:39:21 [Preview] No. 8998 del
It wasn't wrong as you can see it was pretty safe business considering. Well up until cannons started peppering them.
For the minds of the rulers like Friedrich the Great or Napoleon and the generals of the era the musket infantry was just pikemen with extremely long pikes. They thought them as such and used them as such. This is why the musketeers took over the place of the pikemen in the pike and shot formations (after the adaptation of bayonet), pikes are nice but we can reach farther with muskets.
The evolution of the artillery and the appearance of rapid firing infantry weapons were the cause which forced the infantry behind cover, barricades and finally into trenches.

>swords gradually got more curved with time
This would be right if we could see how the Japanese swords evolved from straight to the point when it's a circle. But there's no such pattern. If you pick a decade and hoard all the swords made in that decade you would see curvatures of all degree. Swordsmiths shaped their swords as they preferred.

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 17:07:44 [Preview] No. 9001 del
For the record:

Here under the
>rapid firing infantry weapons
I did not just mean machine guns, but simple rifles with magazines which compared to muzzle loading muskets can be considered as rapid.

I'm familiar with metallurgy on that level I just don't feel the need to overcomplicate my replies to topics which derails the continuity of the thread.

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 17:16:26 [Preview] No. 9002 del
Let's go on with some quotes as I promised. Posted images are just illustrations, no other purpose.

Ardant du Picq became one of the first to document the common tendency of soldiers to fire harmlessly into the air simply for the sake of firing. Du Picq made one of the first thorough investigations into the nature of combat with a questionnaire distributed to French officers in the 1860s. One officer's response to du Picq stated quite frankly that "a good many soldiers fired into the air at long distances," while another observed that "a certain number of our soldiers fired almost in the air, without aiming, seeming to want to stun themselves, to become drunk on rifle fire during this gripping crisis."

Lieutenant George Roupell encountered this same phenomenon while commanding a British platoon in World War I. He stated that the only way he could stop his men from firing into the air was to draw his sword and walk down the trench, "beating the men on the backside and, as I got their attention, telling them to fire low.

The easiest way of pretending to fight or posturing is to fire toward the enemy but just a little bit high.

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 17:20:27 [Preview] No. 9003 del
[Paddy] ''Griffith notes:
Even in the noted "slaughter pens" at Bloody Lane, Marye's Heights, Kennesaw, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor an attacking unit could not only come very close to the defending line, but it could also stay there for hours — and indeed for days — at a time. Civil War musketry did not therefore possess the power to kill large numbers of men, even in very dense formations, at long range. At short range it could and did kill large numbers, but not very quickly.''
Also Grossman adds:
''Griffith estimates that the average musket fire from a Napoleonic
or Civil War regiment firing at an exposed enemy regiment at
an average range of thirty yards, would usually result in hitting
only one or two men per minute!''
Our previous count fits to his observation more or less. A regiment is about 1000 men, five times more then our 200 which killed 0,16 in a minute. Multiply this and we get 0,8 men per minute. However our closest distance was 70-75 m, Griffith calculated with about 30 (which I think would be the closest range, the next step would be a "Fit bayonets!" order and a charge). Let's say on that range our 200 would kill double amount: 0,32. Then 1000 would kill (or wound actually) 1,6 which a rough equivalent of 1-2 men per minute.

Bad visibility but on even closer range:
Sometimes the fire was completely harmless, as Benjamin McIntyre observed in his firsthand account of a totally bloodless nighttime firefight at Vicksburg in 1863. "It seems strange . . . ," wrote McIntyre, "that a company of men can fire volley after volley at a like number of men at not over a distance of fifteen steps and not cause a single casualty. Yet such was the facts in this instance." The musketry of the black-powder era was not always so ineffective, but over and over again the average comes out to only one or two men hit per minute with musketry.

Bernd 07/18/2017 (Tue) 17:27:08 [Preview] No. 9004 del
Some hit rate:
Richard Holmes, in his superb book Acts of War, examines the hit rates of soldiers in a variety of historical battles. At Rorkes Drift in 1897 a small group of British soldiers were surrounded and vastly outnumbered by the Zulu. Firing volley after volley into the massed enemy ranks at point-blank range, it seems as if no round could have possibly missed, and even a 50 percent hit rate would seem to be low. But Holmes estimates that in actuality approximately thirteen rounds were fired for each hit.

In the same way, General Crook's men fired 25,000 rounds at Rosebud Creek on June 16, 1876, causing 99 casualties among the Indians, or 252 rounds per hit.

And in the French defense from fortified positions during the Battle of Wissembourg, in 1870, the French, shooting at German soldiers advancing across open fields, fired 48,000 rounds to hit 404 Germans, for a hit ratio of 1 hit per 119 rounds fired.

And the trend can be found in the firefights of Vietnam, when more than fifty thousand bullets were fired for every enemy soldier killed. " One of the things that amazed me," stated Douglas Graham, a medic with the First Marine Division in Vietnam, who had to crawl out under enemy and friendly fire to aid wounded soldiers, "is how many bullets can be fired during a firefight without anyone getting hurt."
There's an endnote here which says that this 50 000 bullets were fired from automatic weapons, much of these was used to suppress the enemy or as recon probes. Also crew-served weapons, like machine guns are add much to this tally. The more noteworthy part is the observation of the quoted medic.

Feel free to add your radishes.

Bernd 07/19/2017 (Wed) 17:52:15 [Preview] No. 9020 del
This is how real niggaz fought. In packed mass on the open field firing at each other from few dozen steps.


Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:17:32 [Preview] No. 9043 del
Now this is funny:
The Dilemma of the Discarded Weapons
Author of the Civil War Collector's Encyclopedia F. A. Lord tells us that after the Bade of Gettysburg, 27,574 muskets were recovered from the battlefield. Of these, nearly 90 percent (twenty-four thousand) were loaded. Twelve thousand of these loaded muskets were found to be loaded more than once, and six thousand of the multiply loaded weapons had from three to ten rounds loaded in the barrel. One weapon had been loaded twenty-three times. Why, then, were there so many loaded weapons available on the battlefield, and why did at least twelve thousand soldiers misload their weapons in combat?
A loaded weapon was a precious commodity on the black-powder battlefield. During the stand-up, face-to-face, short-range battles of this era a weapon should have been loaded for only a fraction of the time in battle. More than 95 percent of the time was spent in loading the weapon, and less than 5 percent in firing it. If most soldiers were desperately attempting to kill as quickly and efficiently as they could, then 95 percent should have been shot with an empty weapon in their hand, and any loaded, cocked, and primed weapon available dropped on the battlefield would have been snatched up from wounded or dead comrades and fired.
There were many who were shot while charging the enemy or were casualties of artillery outside of musket range, and these individuals would never have had an opportunity to fire their weapons, but they hardly represent 95 percent of all casualties. If there is a desperate need in all soldiers to fire their weapon in combat, then many of these men should have died with an empty weapon. And as the ebb and flow of battle passed over these weapons, many of them should have been picked up and fired at the enemy.
The obvious conclusion is that most soldiers were not trying to kill the enemy. Most of them appear to have not even wanted to fire in the enemy's general direction.
That one dude really did not want to fire his rifle.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:18:34 [Preview] No. 9044 del
(59.50 KB 534x401 firingsquad.jpg)
(350.86 KB 1214x847 rhodesian_bush_war.jpg)
With the changes occurred in warfare we can't rely on similar calculations, estimations, we left with subjective observations of the participants.
We get stuff like this:
In many circumstances highly trained modern soldiers have fought poorly trained guerrilla forces, and the tendency of poorly prepared forces to instinctively engage in posturing mechanisms (such as firing high) has given a significant advantage to the more highly trained force. Jack Thompson, a Rhodesian veteran, observed this process in combat against untrained forces. In Rhodesia, says Thompson, their immediate action drill was to "shed our packs and assault into the fire . . . always. That was because the [guerrillas] were not able to deliver effective fire, and their bullets went high. We would quickly establish fire superiority, and rarely ever lost a man."

One of the best examples of an intentional miss was the experience of my grandfather John, who had been assigned to a firing squad during World War I. A major source of pride from his days as a veteran was that he was able to not kill while a member of that firing squad. He knew that the commands would be "Ready, aim, fire," and he knew that if he aimed at the prisoner on the command of "aim," he would hit the target he was aiming at on the command of "fire." His response was to aim slightly away from the prisoner on the command of "aim," enabling him to miss when he pulled the trigger on the command of "fire." My grandfather bragged for the rest of his life about outsmarting the army in this manner.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:20:34 [Preview] No. 9045 del
(485.68 KB 1050x600 contras-2.gif)
(54.66 KB 405x310 contras-1987.jpg)
''Another excellent example of soldiers exercising their right to miss is this mercenary-journalist's account of going with one of Eden Pastora's (a.k.a. Commandante Zero) Contra units on an ambush of a civilian river launch in Nicaragua:
I'll never forget Surdo's words as he gave his imitation of a Pastora harangue prior to going into battle, telling the entire formation, "Si mata una mujer, mata unapiricuaco; si mata un nino, mata unpiricuaco." Piricuaco is a derogatory term, meaning rabid dog, we used for the Sandinistas, so in effect Surdo was saying "If you kill a woman, you're killing a Sandinista, if you kill a child, you're killing a Sandinista." And off we went to kill women and children. Once again I was part of the 10 men who would actually perform the ambush. We cleared our fields of fire and settled back to await the arrival of women and children and whatever other civilian passengers there might be on this launch. Each man was alone with his thoughts. Not a word was spoken among us regarding the nature of our mission. Surdo paced back and forth nervously some yards behind us in the protection of the jungle.
. . . The loud throb of the powerful diesels of the 70-foot launch preceded its arrival by a good two minutes. The signal to commence firing was given as it appeared in front of us and I watched the RPG-7 [rocket] arc over the boat and into the jungle on the opposite bank. The M60 [machine gun] opened up, I rattled off a 20-round burst from my FAL. Brass was flying as thick as the jungle insects as our squad emptied their magazines. Every bullet sailed harmlessly over the civilian craft.
When Surdo realized what was happening he came running out of the jungle cursing violently in Spanish and firing his AK [rifle] at the disappearing launch. Nicaraguan peasants are mean bastards, and tough soldiers. But they're not murderers. I laughed aloud in relief and pride as we packed up and prepared to move out.

Grossman adds here:
Note the nature of such a "conspiracy to miss." Without a word being spoken, every soldier who was obliged and trained to fire reverted — as millions of others must have over the centuries — to the simple artifice of soldierly incompetence. And like the firing- squad member mentioned earlier, these soldiers took a great and private pleasure in outmaneuvering those who would make them do that which they would not.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:29:22 [Preview] No. 9046 del
(136.52 KB 600x600 tunnel-rats.jpg)
(58.22 KB 600x352 wwi.jpg)
The previous observations can be dissmissed as isolated cases on the other hand Grossman cites a bunch of more throughout his book and refers to his conversations with lots of veterans with similar experiences like this tunnel rat's memories:
Then I cautiously raised the upper half of my body into the tunnel until I was lying flat on my stomach. When I felt comfortable, I placed my Smith Wesson .38-caliber snub-nose (sent to me by my father for tunnel work) beside the flashlight and switched on the light, illuminating the tunnel.
There, not more than 15 feet away, sat a Viet Cong eating a handful of rice from a pouch on his lap. We looked at each other for what seemed to be an eternity, but in fact was probably only a few seconds.
Maybe it was the surprise of actually finding someone else there, or maybe it was just the absolute innocence of the situation, but neither one of us reacted.
After a moment, he put his pouch of rice on the floor of the tunnel beside him, turned his back to me and slowly started crawling away. I, in turn, switched off my flashlight, before slipping back into the lower tunnel and making my way back to the entrance. About 20 minutes later, we received word that another squad had killed a VC emerging from a tunnel 500 meters away. I never doubted who that VC was. To this day, I firmly believe that grunt and I could have ended the war sooner over a beer in Saigon than Henry Kissinger ever could by attending the peace talks.

Colonel Milton Mater served as an infantry company commander in World War II and relates several World War II experiences that strongly support Marshall's observations. Mater also provides us with several instances in which World War I veterans warned him to expect that there would be many nonfirers in combat.
When he first joined the service in 1933, Mater asked his uncle, a veteran of World War I, about his combat experience. "I was amazed to find that the experience foremost in his mind was 'draftees who wouldn't shoot.' He expressed it something like this: 'They thought if they didn't shoot at the Germans, the Germans wouldn't shoot at them.'"

Of course all this still can be considered as anecdotal evidence.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:31:04 [Preview] No. 9047 del
However some less subjective data is available.
Prior to World War II it had always been assumed that the average soldier would kill in combat simply because his country and his leaders have told him to do so and because it is essential to defend his own life and the lives of his friends. When the point came that he didn't kill, it was assumed that he would panic and run.
During World War II U.S. Army Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall asked these average soldiers what it was that they did in battle. His singularly unexpected discovery was that, of every hundred men along the line of fire during the period of an encounter, an average of only 15 to 20 "would take any part with their weapons." This was consistently true "whether the action was spread over a day, or two days or three."
Marshall was a U.S. Army historian in the Pacific theater during World War II and later became the official U.S. historian of the European theater of operations. He had a team of historians working for him, and they based their findings on individual and mass interviews with thousands of soldiers in more than four hundred infantry companies, in Europe and in the Pacific, immediately after they had been in close combat with German or Japanese troops. The results were consistently the same: only 15 to 20 percent of the American riflemen in combat during World War II would fire at the enemy. Those who would not fire did not run or hide (in many cases they were willing to risk great danger to rescue comrades, get ammunition, or run messages), but they simply would not fire their weapons at the enemy, even when faced with repeated waves of banzai charges.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 19:33:04 [Preview] No. 9048 del
While the next part doesn't really fit into my order I'm intend to present these thoughts in the book this comes next immediately:
The question is why. Why did these men fail to fire? As I examined this question and studied the process of killing in combat from the standpoints of a historian, a psychologist, and a soldier, I began to realize that there was one major factor that was missing from the common understanding of killing in combat, a factor that answers this question and more. That missing factor is the simple and demonstrable fact that there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow man. A resistance so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it.
And what I've already scratched a bit:
To some, this makes "obvious" sense. "Of course it is hard to kill someone," they would say. "I could never bring myself to do it." But they would be wrong. With the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will kill. Others might respond, "Any man will kill in combat when he is faced with someone who is trying to kill him." And they would be even more wrong, for in this section we shall observe that throughout history the majority of men on the battlefield would not attempt to kill the enemy, even to save their own lives or the lives of their friends.

That's it for today. Tomorrow I'm not sure I'll have the time to continue but on the weekend I sure will.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 20:13:54 [Preview] No. 9053 del
Thank you Bernd for today, this is a really good thread.
I hope this continues.

Bernd 07/20/2017 (Thu) 22:19:11 [Preview] No. 9054 del
You know what I'm thinking right here?
How fucking small number of irregulars actually willing to kill one would need to completely overwhelm the apparently average pussy.
It's yet again as how mere 5% of people can easily control public opinion.

Fuck OP don't give me any ideas.

Bernd 07/21/2017 (Fri) 05:37:38 [Preview] No. 9056 del
Thanks. Will do continue. I think a short summary is in order.

I had similar thoughts. That a small number of resolute fighters can defeat a larger number of average. Sometimes they did. But much depends on posturing. A larger number of average soldiers could frighten the irregulars even if they determined and willing to kill. Also everyone just assumes almost all soldier would kill.
However the average pussy can be trained to overcome their restraints and modern armies do train them through conditioning as we'll see. The results came in Vietnam and with that came the PTSD for the returning soldiers.

sum Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 10:15:23 [Preview] No. 9181 del
(289.59 KB 1500x900 battle-wallpaper-2.jpg)
A quick summary.
So we talked so far about:
- non-participating and
- mis-firing soldiers.
Touched key concepts:
- the four possible options a soldier faces on the battlefield
- enabling factors of killing
- denying humanity
- conditioning via training
- predisposition toward "aggressive psychopathic personalities"

Next we'll move on the stress the soldiers have to endure and it's impact.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 15:43:32 [Preview] No. 9183 del
(410.19 KB 1519x994 Israeli_Troops.jpg)
(57.38 KB 500x365 shell_shock.jpg)
Probably noone would deny that the job a soldier during war is pretty stressful but rarely anyone would guess that a very significant part of the casualties are psychiatric casualties.
For example:
During World War II more than 800,000 men were classified 4-F (unfit for military service) due to psychiatric reasons. Despite this effort to weed out those mentally and emotionally unfit for combat, America's armed forces lost an additional 504,000 men from the fighting effort because of psychiatric collapse — enough to man fifty divisions! At one point in World War II, psychiatric casualties were being discharged from the U.S. Army faster than new recruits were being drafted in.
In the brief 1973 Arab-Israeli War, almost a third of all Israeli casualties were due to psychiatric causes, and the same seems to have been true among the opposing Egyptian forces. In the 1982 incursion into Lebanon, Israeli psychiatric casualties were twice as high as the number of dead.
What's more:
Swank and Marchand's much-cited World War II study determined that after sixty days of continuous combat, 98 percent of all surviving soldiers will have become psychiatric casualties of one kind or another. Swank and Marchand also found a common trait among the 2 percent who are able to endure sustained combat: a predisposition toward "aggressive psychopathic personalities."
Grossman adds:
It is interesting to note that spending months of continuous exposure to the stresses of combat is a phenomenon found only on the battlefields of this century. Even the years-long sieges of previous centuries provided ample respites from combat, largely due to limitations of artillery and tactics. The actual times of personal risk were seldom more than a few hours in duration. Some psychiatric casualties have always been associated with war, but it is only in this century that our physical and logistical capability to sustain combat has completely outstripped our psychological capacity to endure it.
Humorous paraphrase:
War is an environment that will psychologically debilitate 98 percent of all who participate in it for any length of time. And the 2 percent who are not driven insane by war appear to have already been insane — aggressive psychopaths — before coming to the battlefield.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 15:49:05 [Preview] No. 9185 del
There are many manifestations of these casualties but the treatment is simple, they have to be withdrawn from fight and rest for a period of time in calm environment.
But the problem is that the military does not want to simply return the psychiatric casualty to normal life, it wants to return him to combat! And he is understandably reluctant to go.
The evacuation syndrome is the paradox of combat psychiatry. A nation must care for its psychiatric casualties, since they are of no value on the battlefield — indeed, their presence in combat can have a negative impact on the morale of other soldiers — and they can still be used again as valuable seasoned replacements once they've recovered from combat stress. But if soldiers begin to realize that insane soldiers are being evacuated, the number of psychiatric casualties will increase dramatically. An obvious solution to this problem is to rotate troops out of battle for periodic rest and recuperation — this is standard policy in most Western armies — but this is not always possible in combat.
The solution is to treat the mentally wounded as close to the front as possible and constantly communicate to the soldiers that they will return ASAP. One could try medicate the problem away, the US and Israel used 'truth serum' with some success to release the emotion via talking out their experiences and preventing to bottle it up.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 15:53:43 [Preview] No. 9186 del
(248.20 KB 510x410 sweden03.jpg)
(32.80 KB 480x320 suede_un.jpg)
Now, what gets to the soldiers? What is the source of stress that cripple their nerves?
Grossman starts with Fear of course. What is the source of Fear?
All soldiers face death in some form, there's always a risk of them dying and generally people don't find the thought of that too entertaining. It's widely accepted to consider the fear of death (or getting maimed) the source of psychial casualties. Simple and easy explanation.
But clinical studies that tried to demonstrate that fear of death and injury are responsible for psychiatric casualties have been consistently unsuccessful. An example of such a study is Mitchell Berkun's 1958 research into the nature of psychiatric breakdown in combat. [...] The men put through the controversial — and by today's standards unethical — fear-provoking situations in these Human Resources Research Office tests were then given "long psychiatric interviews before and after and again weeks later to see whether there were any hidden effects. None were found."
The Israeli military psychologist Ben Shalit asked Israeli soldiers immediately after combat what most frightened them. The answer that he expected was "loss of life" or "injury and abandonment in the field." He was therefore surprised to discover the low emphasis on fear of bodily harm and death, and the great emphasis on "letting others down."
Very heroic answer huh - could one add with a cynical tone. But there's a continuation of this research:
Shalit conducted a similar survey of Swedish peacekeeping forces who had not had combat experience. In this instance he received the expected answer of "death and injury" as the "most frightening factor in battle. His conclusion was that combat experience decreases fear of death or injury.
...even in the face of a society and culture that tell the soldiers that selfish fear of death and injury should be their primary concern, it is instead the fear of not being able to meet the terrible obligations of combat that weighs most heavily on the minds of combat soldiers.
A comment on the acceptance of Fear:
How many times have we heard in movies and on television that only fools are not afraid? Such acceptance of fear is a part of modern culture.
Indeed, during World War II, in a widely distributed pamphlet entitled Army Life, the U.S. Army told its soldiers: " YOU'LL BE SCARED . Sure you'll be scared. Before you go into batlle you'll be frightened at the uncertainty, at the thought of being killed." A statistician would call that biasing the sample.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 15:57:39 [Preview] No. 9187 del
(466.09 KB 1200x784 dresden.jpg)
(8.22 KB 264x314 Giulio_Douhet.jpg)
Modern warfare doesn't limit itself to the front lines anymore. WWII is the prime example how the hinterland got it's own share of hardships.
The Italian infantry officer Giulio Douhet became the world's first recognized airpower theoretician with the publication of his book Command of the Air in 1921. Douhet declared, "The disintegration of nations [which] in the last war was brought about by [attrition] will be accomplished directly by . . . aerial forces."
Prior to World War II, psychologists and military theoreticians such as Douhet predicted that mass bombing of cities would create the same degree of psychological trauma seen on the battlefield in World War I. During World War I the probability of a soldier becoming a psychiatric casualty was greater than that of his being killed by enemy fire. As a result of this, authorities envisioned vast numbers of "gibbering lunatics" being driven from their cities by a rain of bombs. Among civilians the impact was projected to be even worse than that seen in combat. When the horror of war touched women, children, and the elderly, rather than trained and carefully selected soldiers, the psychological impact was sure to be too great, and even more civilians than soldiers were expected to snap.
This idea led to the bombing of cities by both sides in WWII. Pesky Italians I would break all their spaghetti in half. But actually everything went better than expected:
And yet, incredibly, the incidence of psychiatric casualties among these individuals was very similar to that of peacetime. There were no incidents of mass psychiatric casualties. The Rand Corporation study of the psychological impact of air raids, published in 1949, found that there was only a very slight increase in the "more or less long-term" psychological disorders as compared with peacetime rates. And those that did appear seemed to "occur primarily among already predisposed persons." Indeed, bombing seemed to have served primarily to harden the hearts and empower the killing ability of those who endured it.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 16:03:08 [Preview] No. 9188 del
(21.43 KB 426x300 tankertorp.jpg)
(34.46 KB 405x270 everyday_heroes.jpg)
There are other types of human elements who participate in war beside those on the front. Grossman call them nonkillers.
Nonkillers are frequently exposed to the same brutal conditions as killers, conditions that cause fear, but they do not become psychiatric casualties. In most circumstances in which nonkillers are faced with the threat of death and injury in war, the instances of psychiatric casualties are notably absent. These circumstances include civilian victims of strategic bombing attacks, civilians and prisoners of war under artillery fire and bombings, sailors on board ship during combat, soldiers on reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines, medical personnel, and officers in combat.
He takes and examines these groups one by one just like he did with the civilians. Then he concludes:
It would appear that, at least in the realm of psychiatric casualty causation, fear does not reign supreme on the battlefield. The effect of fear should never be underestimated, but it is clearly not the only, or even the major, factor responsible for psychiatric casualties on the battlefield.
The point is that fear is only one of many factors, and it seldom, if ever, is the sole cause of psychiatric casualties.
The magnitude of the exhaustion and the horror suffered by combat veterans and victims of strategic bombing is generally comparable. The stress factors that soldiers experienced and bombing victims did not were the two-edged responsibility of (1) being expected to kill (the irreconcilable balancing of to kill and not to kill) and (2) the stress of looking their potential killers in the face (the Wind of Hate).

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 16:09:52 [Preview] No. 9189 del
(59.65 KB 736x736 exhausted_gi.jpg)
(42.89 KB 400x400 exhausted_french.jpg)
"Physiological Exhaustion" comes next, let's just summarize it with a short quote:
Psychologist F. C. Bartlett emphasized the psychological impact of physical exhaustion in combat. "In war," he wrote, "there is perhaps no general condition which is more likely to produce a large crop of nervous and mental disorders than a state of prolonged and great fatigue." The four factors of (1) physiological arousal caused by the stress of existing in what is commonly understood as a continual fight-or-flight-arousal condition, (2) cumulative loss of sleep, (3) the reduction in caloric intake, and (4) the toll of the elements — such as rain, cold, heat, and dark of night — assaulting the soldier all combine to form the "state of prolonged and great fatigue" that is the Weight of Exhaustion.

Next: Horror.
Beyond fear and exhaustion is a sea of horror that surrounds the soldier and assails his every sense.
Hear the pitiful screams of the wounded and dying. Smell the butcher-house smells of feces, blood, burned flesh, and rotting decay, which combine into the awful stench of death. Feel the shudder of the ground as the very earth groans at the abuse of artillery and explosives, and feel the last shiver of life and the flow of warm blood as friends die in your arms. Taste the salt of blood and tears as you hold a dear friend in mutual grieving, and you do not know or care if it is the salt of your tears or his.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 16:15:22 [Preview] No. 9190 del
(21.20 KB 320x213 screaming.jpg)
(739.49 KB 768x576 warface.png)
What is Wind of Hate?
Basically close interpersonal aggression that one needs to face not just on the battlefield but during our daily lives. Grossman gives a lengthy description of this civilian hardship, let's just grab a line:
All of us have had to face hostile aggression. On the playground as children, in the impoliteness of strangers, in the malicious gossip and comments of acquaintances, and in the animosity of peers and superiors in the workplace.
It's not unknown to any of us and Bernds on KC main oftentimes cry about their anxiety if they need to go to the outside world supposing they have to face this Wind of Hate in all their interactions.
Some people just cannot cope with this and takes action.
Indeed, history is full of tales of soldiers who have committed suicide or inflicted terrible wounds upon themselves to avoid combat. It isn't fear of death that motivates these men to kill themselves. Like many of their civilian counterparts who commit suicide, these men would rather die or mutilate themselves than face the aggression and hostility of a very hostile world.
It has a military application:
Psychologically, aerial and artillery bombardments are effective, but only in the front lines when they are combined with the Wind of Hate, as manifested in the threat of the personal infantry attack that usually follows such bombardments.
This is why there were mass psychiatric casualties following World War I artillery bombardments, but World War II's mass bombings of cities were surprisingly counterproductive in breaking the enemy's will. Such bombardments without an accompanying close-range assault, or at least the threat of such an assault, are ineffective and may even serve no other purpose than to stiffen the will and resolve of the enemy!
[...]What maneuver warfare advocates have discovered is that over and over in history, civilians and soldiers have withstood the actuality of fear, horror, death, and destruction during artillery bombardments and aerial bombardments without losing their will to fight, while the mere threat of invasion and close-up interpersonal aggression has consistently turned whole populations into refugees fleeing in panic.
[...]The potential of close-up, inescapable, interpersonal hatred and aggression is more effective and has greater impact on the morale of the soldier than the presence of inescapable, impersonal death and destruction.

Bernd 07/22/2017 (Sat) 16:22:45 [Preview] No. 9191 del
Before Grossman proceeds with the Burden of Killing he ends this train of thought with a metaphor:
Many authorities speak and write of emotional stamina on the batllefield as a finite resource. I have termed this the Well of Fortitude. Faced with the soldier's encounters with horror, guilt, fear, exhaustion, and hate, each man draws steadily from his own private reservoir of inner strength and fortitude until finally the well runs dry.
Not just individuals but units as a whole has this Well, and sometimes green ones can perform better then veterans as they have more Fortitude to spare.
One can replenish from the well of others, for example a good leader can inspire his subordinates and help them holding on longer. Victory and success also helps the individual and the unit to go on.

Now I'm gonna end this for today too. I'm not sure if my editing is adequate and clear which lines are the quotes, if something not clear just write.

Bernd 07/25/2017 (Tue) 17:13:20 [Preview] No. 9220 del
(297.87 KB 900x597 dead_cong.jpg)
Despite the picture the media paints for us soldiers aren't capable of casually slaughtering masses of men without remorse or psychological impact on themselves.
William Manchester, author and U.S. Marine veteran of World War II, felt remorse and shame after his close-range personal killing of a Japanese soldier. "I can remember," he wrote, "whispering foolishly, 'I'm sorry' and then just throwing up . . . I threw up all over myself. It was a betrayal of what I'd been taught since a child." Other combat veterans tell of the emotional responses associated with a close-range kill that echo Manchester's horror.
"Killing is the wont thing that one man can do to another man . . . it's the last thing that should happen anywhere." - Israeli lieutenant
"I reproached myself as a destroyer. An indescribable uneasiness came over me, I felt almost like a criminal." - Napoleonic-era British soldier
"This was the first time I had killed anybody and when things quieted down I went and looked at a German I knew I had shot. I remember thinking that he looked old enough to have a family and I felt very sorry." - British World War I veteran after his first kill
"It didn't hit me all that much then, but when I think of it now — I slaughtered those people. I murdered them." - German World War II veteran
"And I froze, 'cos it was a boy, I would say between the ages of twelve and fourteen. When he turned at me and looked, all of a sudden he turned his whole body and pointed his automatic weapon at me, I just opened up, fired the whole twenty rounds right at the kid, and he just laid there. I dropped my weapon and cried." - U.S. Special Forces officer and Vietnam veteran
"I fired again and somehow got him in the head. There was so much blood . . . I vomited, until the rest of the boys came up." - Israeli Six-Day War veteran
"So this new Peugeot comes towards us, and we shoot. And there was a family there — three children. And I cried, but I couldn't take the chance. . . . Children, father, mother. All the family was killed, but we couldn't take the chance." - Israeli Lebanon Incursion veteran

Bernd 07/25/2017 (Tue) 17:18:38 [Preview] No. 9221 del
(35.78 KB 326x263 BastSig.jpg)
(71.33 KB 638x423 101st_airborne.jpg)
The magnitude of the trauma associated with killing became particularly apparent to me in an interview with Paul, a VFW post commander and sergeant of the 101st Airborne at Bastogne in World War II. He talked freely about his experiences and about comrades who had been killed, but when I asked him about his own kills he stated that usually you couldn't be sure who it was that did the killing. Then tears welled up in Paul's eyes, and after a long pause he said, "But the one time I was sure . . ." and then his sentence was stopped by a little sob, and pain racked the face of this old gentleman. "It still hurts, after all these years?" I asked in wonder. "Yes," he said, "after all these years." And he would not speak of it again.
The next day he told me, "You know, Captain, the questions you're asking, you must be very careful not to hurt anyone with these questions. Not me, you know, I can take it, but some of these young guys are still hurting very badly. These guys don't need to be hurt anymore." These memories were the scabs of terrible, hidden wounds in the minds of these kind and gentle men.

Bernd 07/25/2017 (Tue) 17:20:29 [Preview] No. 9222 del
But if they're there they kinda have to do it.
Numerous studies have concluded that men in combat are usually motivated to fight not by ideology or hate or fear, but by group pressures and processes involving (1) regard for their comrades, (2) respect for their leaders, (3) concern for their own reputation with both, and (4) an urge to contribute to the success of the group.
Repeatedly we see combat veterans describe the powerful bonds that men forge in combat as stronger than those of husband and wife.
This bonding is so intense that it is fear of failing these comrades that preoccupies most combatants. Countless sociological and psychological studies, the personal narratives of numerous veterans, and the interviews I have conducted clearly indicate the strength of the soldier's concern for failing his buddies. The guilt and trauma associated with failing to fully support men w h o are bonded with friendship and camaraderie on this magnitude is profoundly intense. Yet every soldier and every leader feels this guilt to one degree or another. For those who know that they have not fired while their friends died around them, the guilt is traumatic.

Bernd 07/25/2017 (Tue) 17:27:11 [Preview] No. 9223 del
(154.99 KB 728x409 drstrangelove.jpg)
Of course there's always denial.
Balancing the obligation to kill with the resulting toll of guilt forms a significant cause of psychiatric casualties on the battlefield. Philosopher-psychologist Peter Marin speaks of the soldier's lesson in responsibility and guilt. What the soldier knows as a result of war is that "the dead remain dead, the maimed are forever maimed, and there is no way to deny one's responsibility or culpability, for those mistakes are written, forever and as if in fire, in others' flesh."
Ultimately there may be no way to deny one's responsibility or culpability for mistakes written "forever and as if in fire, in others' flesh," but combat is a great furnace fed by the small flickering flames of attempts at denial. The burden of killing is so great that most men try not to admit that they have killed. They deny it to others, and they try to deny it to themselves. Dinter quotes a hardened veteran who, upon being asked about killing, stated emphatically that
"Most of the killing you do in modern war is impersonal. A thing few people realize is that you hardly ever see a German. Very few men — even in the infantry — actually have the experience of aiming a weapon at a German and seeing the man fall."
Even the language of men at war is full of denial of the enormity of what they have done. Most soldiers do not "kill," instead the enemy was knocked over, wasted, greased, taken out, and mopped up. The enemy is hosed, zapped, probed, and fired on. The enemy's humanity is denied, and he becomes a strange beast called a Kraut, Jap, Reb , Yank, dink, slant, or slope. Even the weapons of war receive benign names — Puff the Magic Dragon, Walleye, TOW , Fat Boy, and Thin Man — and the killing weapon of the individual soldier becomes a piece or a hog, and a bullet becomes a round.

For next time I'll try to gather some quotes by soldiers who didn't give a shit just for the sake completness. I remember this book has some of that too.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 17:59:19 [Preview] No. 9259 del
There was a thread on KC today about infanticide in Papuan tribes and Aborigines doing fucked up stuff

Thread: https://archive.is/6ee4C

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 18:07:42 [Preview] No. 9260 del
(557.09 KB 617x1404 1501049798001.jpg)
kek, I accidentally hit the reply button, before writing more. Some Bernds claim that this is natural behaviour and serves as population control and this kind of killing and eating humans or witches was done in pre-Christian Europe as well.
original link of the story: http://psychohistory.com/books/the-origins-of-war-in-child-abuse/chapter-7-child-abuse-homicide-and-raids-in-tribes/

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 18:37:18 [Preview] No. 9261 del
Soon I'll arrive the part about the enabling factors of killing. Grossman writes about atrocity too and it's place in human psychology.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 18:42:19 [Preview] No. 9262 del
(389.24 KB 1600x1067 chicken_butchering.JPG)
(1.26 MB 1500x1135 bomber_crew.jpg)
(362.06 KB 799x583 M777 howitzer (2).jpg)
(145.65 KB 900x574 vietnam_snipers.jpg)
I collected a few lines from the book on the easiness of killing. Some are actual quotes some just data or observation of the author. Some of them are removed from context but whatever.

"I could not visualize the horrible deaths my bombs. . . had caused here. I had no feeling of guilt. I had no feeling of accomplishment." - J. Douglas Harvey, World War II bomber pilot, visiting rebuilt Berlin in the 1960s

From January 7 to July 24, 1969, U.S. Army snipers in Vietnam accounted for 1,245 confirmed kills, with an average of 1.39 bullets expended per kill.

"At 2109 [on February 3, 1969] five Viet Cong moved from the woodline to the edge of the rice paddy and the first Viet Cong in the group was taken under fire . . . resulting in one Viet Cong killed. Immediately the other Viet Cong formed a huddle around the fallen body, apparently not quite sure of what had taken place. Sergeant Waldron continued engaging the Viet Cong one by one until a total of [all] five Viet Cong were killed."

Gray states the matter clearly: "Many a pilot or artilleryman who has destroyed untold numbers of terrified noncombatants has never felt any need for repentance or regret."

Even in the case of the individuals who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, contrary to popular myth, there are no indications of psychological problems.

The future field marshal Slim wrote of experiencing this euphoria upon shooting a Turk in Mesopotamia in 1917. "I suppose it is brutal," wrote Slim, "but I had a feeling of the most intense satisfaction as the wretched Turk went spinning down."

An Australian soldier in World War I, writing in a letter to his father, puts a distinctly different light on bayoneting Germans:
"Strike me pink the square heads are dead mongrels. They will keep firing until you are two yds. off them & then drop their rifles & ask for mercy. They get it too right where the chicken gets the axe. . . . I . . . will fix a few more before I have finished. Its good sport father when the bayonet goes in there eyes bulge out like prawns. [Sic]"

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 19:07:35 [Preview] No. 9263 del
(173.57 KB 1252x1252 kek.jpg)
>The future field marshal Slim wrote of experiencing this euphoria upon shooting a Turk in Mesopotamia in 1917. "I suppose it is brutal," wrote Slim, "but I had a feeling of the most intense satisfaction as the wretched Turk went spinning down."
top kek

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 19:13:31 [Preview] No. 9264 del
Apparently killing T*rks and Germans is fun.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 19:26:58 [Preview] No. 9265 del
This is proof that modern police officers are either dehumanized or psychopaths.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 19:29:54 [Preview] No. 9266 del
meant for

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 19:58:32 [Preview] No. 9267 del
(83.29 KB 600x337 target_practice.jpeg)
Not necessarily. Policemen are conditioned to kill just like modern soldiers. For example shooting at targets looks like people or combat shooting is part of the conditioning.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=ijJFVA_AWQI [Embed]

Of course that 2% of nutcases tends to converge toward certain groups and organizations. In the army they become snipers or members of special forces. In civil life they seek employment at the police.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 20:11:12 [Preview] No. 9268 del
(49.73 KB 628x490 190213target3.jpg)
(31.15 KB 517x490 190213target1.jpg)
Well when you compare the war stats where the soldiers would not fire under direct combat - the police have the most compliance for less intensity than military combat.

And there is DHS targets that have mothers and children. This is madness.

Bernd 07/26/2017 (Wed) 20:45:17 [Preview] No. 9269 del
Those army firing rates are pre-modern training (some places Grossman refers to it as WWII training). Those reports by Marshall drove the US military command to make some changes. They started conditioning the soldiers via different training techniques. In Korea they got numbers that were enough to prove them they are on the right track and perfected these techniques so in Vietnam they got 90-95% firing rates.
Basically they made killers from a bunch of ordinary people who didn't have any predisposition toward killing. This and other factors led to their PTSD.

Bernd 07/27/2017 (Thu) 01:31:47 [Preview] No. 9272 del
I should have read the thread.

Bernd 07/27/2017 (Thu) 04:54:37 [Preview] No. 9273 del
>Those army firing rates are pre-modern training rates.

It's not too late. Still a bunch's coming.

Bernd 07/27/2017 (Thu) 18:35:57 [Preview] No. 9288 del
(336.01 KB 997x854 killing_factors.png)
What enables killing?
Here's a concise summary:

Demands of Authority
- Proximity of the obedience-demanding authority figure to the subject
- Subject's subjective respect for the obedience-demanding authority figure
- Intensity of the obedience-demanding authority figure's demands of killing behavior
- Legitimacy of the obedience-demanding authority figure's authority and demands

Group Absolution
- Subject's identification with the group
- Proximity of the group to the subject
- Intensity of the group's support for the kill
- Number in the immediate group
- Legitimacy of the group

Total Distance from the Victim
1. Physical distance between the killer and the victim
2. Emotional distance between the killer and the victim, including:
- Social distance, which considers the impact of a lifetime of viewing a particular class as less than human in a socially stratified environment
- Cultural distance, which includes racial and ethnic differences that permit the killer to "dehumanize" the victim
- Moral distance, which takes into consideration intense belief in moral superiority and "vengeful" actions
- Mechanical distance, which includes the sterile "video game" unreality of killing through a TV screen, a thermal sight, a sniper sight, or some other kind of mechanical buffer

The Shalit Factors
Israeli military psychology has developed a model revolving around the nature of the victim, which I have incorporated into this model. This model considers the tactical circumstances associated with:
1. Relevance and effectiveness of available strategies for killing the victim
2. Relevance of the victim as a threat to the killer and his tactical situation
3. ''Payoff of the killer's action in terms of
- Killer's gain
- Enemy's loss

The Predisposition of the Killer
- Training/conditioning of the soldier (Marshall's contributions to the U.S. Army's training program increased the firing rate of the individual infantryman from 15 to 20 percent in World War II to 55 percent in Korea and nearly 90 to 95 percent in Vietnam.)
- Recent experiences of the soldier (For example, having a friend or relative killed by the enemy has been strongly linked with killing behavior on the battlefield.)
The temperament that predisposes a soldier to killing behavior is one of the most difficult areas to research. However, Swank and Marchand did propose the existence of 2 percent of combat soldiers who are predisposed to be "aggressive psychopaths" and who apparently do not experience the trauma commonly associated with killing behavior. These findings have been tentatively confirmed by other observers and by USAF figures concerning aggressive killing behavior among fighter pilots.

Now, at "distance from the victim" Grossman isn't precise because dehumanizing is true all the other options as he states in his book elsewhere. For example artillerymen aren't killing people, they just shooting at coordinates or proletarian revolutionaries aren't killing people but the opressor bourgeoisie.

Bernd 07/31/2017 (Mon) 20:32:51 [Preview] No. 9347 del
(447.63 KB 1200x800 csorike.jpg)
(689.16 KB 2001x1500 honvédség 1(1).jpg)
(236.08 KB 1024x768 Magyar-Honvédség.jpg)
Let's review these factors a little more closely.

The first on the list is the Demands of Authority.
Grossman builds his arguments on dr. Stanley Milgram's studies on obedience and aggression. Here's the wiki article for details:
Even our favourit Austro-Jewish psychologist used to say:
"never underestimate the power of the need to obey,"
and he was actually right in this particular case.
In these experiments some egghead in a labcoat was the demanding authority and he could ride the 65% of the subjects to administer lethal amount of electricity.
Now let's imagine this authority as someone who in the eye of the public opinion is there to order his subordinates and to be obeyed by his subordinates. Someone who got it's authority from the state through the chain of command. Someone who might even be a decorated war veteran, a soldier with high prestige. Or even someone who has the air of command, an air of authority by his nature, a born leader, inspiring and respected.
As Ardant du Picq put it in words:
"The mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society."
And he commands people who are trained to be obedient. Who are expected to be obedient else they'll have to face the court-martial or in certain situation sure death.
I'll add something about the training. All of my relatives, friends and acquaintances who served as conscripts told me when they spoke about their times in the army that they constantly had to perform nonsense unnecessary tasks or simple tasks made difficult by certain requirements and they all thought these were useless. But they are wrong. This is part of the training to be obedient. To perform orders without question or second-guessing even those which seem irrational to the soldier. We have a saying in the Hungarian Army: "if it's round we carry it, if it's angular we roll it, this is the Hungarian Defense Force".

Bernd 07/31/2017 (Mon) 20:34:01 [Preview] No. 9348 del
Now some quotes:
1973 study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss investigated the factors that make a soldier fire. They found that the individuals who had no combat experience assumed that "being fired upon" would be the critical factor in making them fire. However, veterans listed "being told to fire" as the most critical factor.
More than a century ago, Ardant du Picq found the same thing in his study based on a survey of military officers. He noted one incident during the Crimean War in which, during heavy fighting, two detachments of soldiers suddenly met unexpectedly face-to-face, at "ten paces." They "stopped thunderstruck. Then, forgetting their rifles, threw stones and withdrew." The reason for this behavior, according to du Picq, was that "neither of the two groups had a decided leader."

Bernd 07/31/2017 (Mon) 20:37:16 [Preview] No. 9349 del
(60.60 KB 585x389 zhukov.jpeg)
(106.99 KB 964x651 pung.jpg)
(122.85 KB 700x857 bigeard.jpg)
This Authority has some factors:
1. Proximity of the authority figure to the subject. Marshall noted many specific World War II incidents in which almost all soldiers would fire their weapons while their leaders observed and encouraged them in a combat situation, but when the leaders left, the firing rate immediately dropped to 15 to 20 percent.
2. Killer's subjective respect for the authority figure. To be truly effective, soldiers must bond to their leader just as they must bond to their group. Shalit notes a 1973 Israeli study that shows that the primary factor in ensuring the will to fight is identification with the direct commanding officer. Compared with an established and respected leader, an unknown or discredited leader has much less chance of gaining compliance from soldiers in combat.
3. Intensity of the authority figure's demands for killing behavior. The leader's mere presence is not always sufficient to ensure killing activity. The leader must also communicate a clear expectancy of killing behavior. When he does, the influence can be enormous. When Lieutenant Calley first ordered his men to kill a group of women and children in the village of My Lai, he said, "You know what to do with them," and left. When he came back he asked, "Why haven't you killed them?" The soldier he confronted said, "I didn't think you wanted us to kill them." "No," Calley responded, "I want them dead," and proceeded to fire at them himself. Only then was he able to get his soldiers to start shooting in this extraordinary circumstance in which the soldiers' resistance to killing was, understandably, very high.
4. Legitimacy of the authority figure's authority and demands. Leaders with legitimate, societally sanctioned authority have greater influence on their soldiers; and legitimate, lawful demands are more likely to be obeyed than illegal or unanticipated demands. Gang leaders and mercenary commanders have to carefully work around their shortcomings in this area, but military officers (with their trappings of power and the legitimate authority of their nation behind them) have tremendous potential to cause their soldiers to overcome individual resistance and reluctance in combat.

Bernd 07/31/2017 (Mon) 20:38:34 [Preview] No. 9350 del
(627.21 KB 1920x1080 romanarmy.jpg)
(111.12 KB 800x460 phalanx.jpg)
Grossman reflects on the historical role of the leaders. Earlier I mentioned the difference between the Greek phalanx and the Roman manipulus. He writes about this in this chapter. In short:
In the Greek phalanx the leader at squad and platoon level was a spear-carrying member of the masses. The primary function of these leaders (as defined by their equipment and lack of mobility within the formation) was to participate in the killing. The Roman formation, on the other hand, had a series of mobile, highly trained, and carefully selected leaders whose primary job was not to kill but to stand behind their men and demand that they kill.
Many factors led to the military supremacy that permitted the Romans to conquer the world. For example, their volleys of cleverly designed javelins provided physical distance in the killing process, and their training enabled the individual to use the point and overcame the natural resistance to thrusting. But most authorities agree that a key factor was the degree of professionalism in their small-unit leaders, combined with a formation that facilitated the influence of these leaders.

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 17:07:22 [Preview] No. 9370 del
Second: Group Absolution

Soldiers don't just fight as individuals but also as units.
A tremendous volume of research indicates that the primary factor that motivates a soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to do in combat (that is, killing and dying) is not the force of self preservation but a powerful sense of accountability to his comrades on the battlefield.
Of course this bond has to be created and nurtured. The training and the common 'adventures' and trials should guarantee this. It needs time. Of course this bond can be surpassed by failures, losses, defeat.
The defeat of even the most elite group is usually achieved when so many casualties have been inflicted (usually somewhere around the 50 percent point) that the group slips into a form of mass depression and apathy. Dinter points out that " The integration of the individual in the group is so strong sometimes that the group's destruction, e.g. by force or captivity, may lead to depression and subsequent suicide." Among the Japanese in World War II this manifested itself in mass suicide. In most historical groups it results in the group suicide of surrender.
''Marshall noted that a single soldier falling back from a broken
and retreating unit will be of little value if pressed into service in
another unit. But if a pair of soldiers or the remnants of a squad
or platoon are put to use, they can generally be counted upon to
fight well.''
[...] If the individual is bonded with his comrades, and //"he is with "his" group, then the probability that the individual will participate in killing is significantly increased. But if those factors are absent, the probability that the individual will be an active participant in combat is quite low.
''Du Picq sums this matter up when he says, "Four brave men
who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four
less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability
and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There,"
says du Picq, "is the science of the organization of armies in
a nutshell."''

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 17:10:16 [Preview] No. 9371 del
(149.69 KB 501x334 lynch-mob-jakarta.jpg)
(160.47 KB 980x552 mass_demo.jpg)
The group also hides us.
In addition to creating a sense of accountability, groups also enable killing through developing in their members a sense of anonymity that contributes further to violence. In some circumstances this process of group anonymity seems to facilitate a kind of atavistic killing hysteria that can also be seen in the animal kingdom. Kruck's 1972 research describes scenes from the animal kingdom that show that senseless and wanton killing does occur. These include the slaughter of gazelles by hyenas, in quantities way beyond their need or capacity to eat, or the destruction of gulls that could not fly on a stormy night and thus were "sitting ducks" for foxes that proceed to kill them beyond any possible need for food. Shalit points out that "such senseless violence in the animal world — as well as most of the violence in the human domain — is shown by groups rather than by individuals."
Konrad Lorenz tells us that "man is not a killer, but the group is."
''Shalit demonstrates a profound understanding of this process
and has researched it extensively:''
"All crowding has an intensifying effect. If aggression exists, it will become more so as a result of crowding; if joy exists, it will become intensified by the crowd."
Good here examples are mass demonstrations like the recent one in Hamburg, how things can spiral out of hand.

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 17:13:12 [Preview] No. 9372 del
(81.28 KB 770x528 hoplites.jpg)
(42.90 KB 500x411 machine_gun_team.jpeg)
(183.95 KB 736x477 cannon.jpg)
There were certain unit types throughout history which utilized the potential of the team, Grossman usually calls these "crew-served weapons".
The first one was the chariot which was a genious idea for several reasons (most likely unknown by contemporaries):
Several factors were at play here — the bow as a distance weapon, the social distance created by the archers' having come from the nobility, and the psychological distance created by using the chariot in pursuit and shooting men in the back — but the key issue is that the chariot crew traditionally consisted of two men: a driver and an archer. And this was all that was needed to provide the same accountability and anonymity in close-proximity groups that in World War II permitted nearly 100 percent of crew- served weapons (such as machine guns) to fire while only 15 to 20 percent of the riflemen fired.
The second one stretches the boundaries of the "crew-served" expression, however it really enables anonimity with it's relatively uniformed equipment and order.
The chariot was defeated by the phalanx, which succeeded by turning the whole formation into a massive crew-served weapon. Although he did not have the designated leaders of the later Roman formations, each man in the phalanx was under a powerful mutual surveillance system, and in the charge it would be hard to fail to strike home without having others notice that your spear had been raised or dropped at the critical moment. And, of course, in addition to this accountability system the closely packed phalanx provided a high degree of mob anonymity.
Times fly by:
And when gunpowder was introduced, it was the crew-served cannon, later augmented by the machine gun, that did most of the killing.
During World War I the machine gun was introduced and termed the "distilled essence of the infantry," but it really was the continuation of the cannon, as artillery became an indirect-fire weapon (shooting over the soldiers' heads from miles back), and the machine gun replaced the cannon in the direct-fire, mid-range role.

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 18:17:07 [Preview] No. 9375 del
(304.94 KB 1200x1792 1501679063259.jpg)

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 19:47:49 [Preview] No. 9377 del
I dunno there probably are some men who would kill for her. But one can find insane men left and right.

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 20:07:27 [Preview] No. 9383 del
I would kill whomever told her using makeup like that is a good idea

Bernd 08/02/2017 (Wed) 20:28:46 [Preview] No. 9385 del
(2.54 MB 1200x1792 Palvin_Jokey.png)
I've no idea how should I do this correctly the pic clearly isn't a BONG so you got picrel.

Bernd 08/03/2017 (Thu) 19:18:45 [Preview] No. 9396 del
better already

Bernd 08/10/2017 (Thu) 10:54:19 [Preview] No. 9513 del
>infantry fire was so embarrassingly ineffective in the past 300 years
I'm not so sure about accurancy of rifles in 1700-until breach loading became popular in military.

Hm I'm seeing a few flaws in that experiment. To kill one soldier sometimes you need just one hit. Meanwhile in one salvo one soldier (that on front line) could get multiple hits, dying but also serving as a shield for those behind him. Also ball could have gone between soldiers landing somewhere where it have done little harm, while on a 100 metres long target it would show a hit. Line infatry didn't neccesarily stand in super tight arm to arm formations, right? Also also you will get different results while doing a prepared experiment in calm conditions then in real battle when bullets fly everywhere, people around you are dying violenty, gunpowder is gettin wet, your weapon is failing, officers are nowhere to be seen and you just shat in your pants.
So I'm not totally convinced about those number differences.

I'm a bit late to discussion and I haven't read entire thread yet so please forgive if it was already adressed.

Bernd 08/10/2017 (Thu) 11:05:10 [Preview] No. 9514 del
Another problems I see there.
1) Black powder weapons fail sometimes (as any weapon tbh). And when they do it takes fuckload of time to make it werk again. Often it would mean weapon is out of this fight. Maybe breech-loaded rifle could be cleaned more easily, but for muzzle-loaded gun it's a huge broblem.
2) When in formation where everyone is shooting, there's a lot of smoke and light and noise, you could sometimes not notice that your rifle didn't fire and load it again after pulling the trigger.
3) It seems there was much more discipline in firing in those times. No fire at will whenever you think it's ok, everyone is loading at the same rate, firing is done according to officer instructions, so no firing as fast as possible and no grabbing weapons from the dead.

Bernd 08/13/2017 (Sun) 09:00:07 [Preview] No. 9552 del
While all points are valid they aren't contributing so much to explain the difference.
On the other hand I left out such facts as in practice the opposing forces many times fired at each other from much closer distance then 70 m (sometimes they fired shots after shots from a literal few steps inside a room without any result - only hoping the other will forced into submission with superior posturing).
Or while I took under consideration of artillery fire contributing the sum of losses in my calculation if I remember right I downplayed it's effectiveness (maybe to third instead of half), moreover I did not calculated the role of grenadiers who were the most effective troops of the infantry. These soldiers weren't equipped with just rifle/musket but with grenades which was so successful weapon that eventually all infantry troops were equipped with that (rendering "grenadier" to a simple title used to elite troops). We can't calculate how much percentage of the total casualties were caused by grenades but we know this was the preferred killing method of infantry during WW I and II (a WW II battalion used up about 500 grenades on a good fighting day). Why? Because it's easier to lob an iron knob (or and iron knob on a stick) into the vicinity of the enemy and waiting for fate to run it's course then actually target a fellow man, pull the trigger then watch him fall.
Also don't forget that the times of line infantry while the grenadiers lobbed grenades at the enemy lines the other troops stood and fired on the enemy... from grenade throwing range which is somewhere between 20 and 30 m.
All in all with rifles infantry killed much less then what I calculated.

Also you're not late I'm going to continue I'm just more interested in the content of the CD right now.

Bernd 08/13/2017 (Sun) 09:03:19 [Preview] No. 9553 del
Or more liek 15-25 m.

Bernd 08/29/2017 (Tue) 00:39:43 [Preview] No. 9808 del
The Battle of Lepanto
>The turning of the tide of the Ottoman advance is due to the prayers of the millions of Catholics in Christendom. October 7th, the day the battle took place, is now the feast of Our Lady of the Rosary, and the month of October is the month of the Rosary.

Bernd 08/29/2017 (Tue) 18:06:18 [Preview] No. 9817 del
I didn't forget this thread I've just too much on my plate right now.
Yes, Lepanto was an important naval battle but might be overrated in the sense that it didn't caused the halt of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire but it was the sign of the sprouting weakness every empire has to face. So it's not a cause but an effect.
If you are interested in an interesting Ottoman story look up the last year or so of the life of Mehmed II and the siege of Otranto.

Top | Return | Catalog | Post a reply